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THE "SUBSTANTIAL UNCERTAINTY" OF THE VIABILITY OF
WOODSON CLAIMS AFTER VALENZUELA V. PALLET EXPRESS, INC.*

[lff this doesn't make it then we'll at least know that there is no

such thing as a Woodson claim.
-Christopher Mauriello, Attorney for the
Valenzuela Family 1
INTRODUCTION

Two decades ago, the Supreme Court of North Carolina carved
out an important exception to the exclusive remedy provision of the
North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act 2 (the "Act") which
generally limits an employee's recovery for work-related injuries and
precludes common law remedies. 3 A claim based on this exception,
commonly called a Woodson claim, is a cause of action for employees'
injuries resulting from an employer's intentional misconduct that is
"substantially certain to cause serious injury or death"-the
"substantial certainty" standard.4
The creation of this exception was significant for two reasons.
First, the newly minted Woodson claim allowed injured employees to
pursue tort remedies outside of the Act for employer misconduct that
was not a true intentional tort, which already fell outside the exclusive
remedy provision,' and second, it signaled to offending employers
that they would no longer be allowed to hide behind the nearly
impenetrable shield of the Act, and thus served as a deterrent. Yet,
almost immediately after creating this new substantive right, North
Carolina appellate courts began chipping away at the availability of
the cause of action by disposing of most claims on summary judgment

* © 2012 Leah D'Aurora Richardson.
1. Sylvia Adcock, No Woodson Claim for Teen Shredded in Machinery, N.C. LAW.
WKLY., Oct. 11, 2010, at 1.
2. North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 120, 1929 N.C. Sess. Laws 117
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -101 (2011)).
3. See § 97-10.1.
4. Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 340-41,407 S.E.2d 222,228 (1991).
5. See notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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in favor of the defendant employer, a practice that has continued to
6
the present.
In Valenzuela v. Pallet Express, Inc.,' the family of Nery
Castafieda Valenzuela filed a Woodson claim against Pallet Express
for alleged intentional misconduct.8 Nery was an underage immigrant
worker who was killed while working alone on an industrial pallet
shredder.9 In what has become customary practice when faced with a
Woodson claim,1" the North Carolina Court of Appeals once again
affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendant employer,
finding insufficient evidence to support an issue of material fact
regarding whether the defendant employer "engaged in intentional
conduct substantially certain to cause Nery's death." 1 The court came
to this conclusion despite the employer's admission that
manufacturer-installed safety guards were intentionally removed
from the dangerous wood-shredding machinery and that the
improperly trained underage immigrant was allowed to work on the
unguarded machine unsupervised. 12
This Recent Development argues that the Woodson exception
has become an illusory cause of action for injured employees in North
Carolina because of the confusion regarding the meaning of the
substantial certainty standard and its use in evaluating Woodson
claims.'3 Further, it argues that an employer that engages in
misconduct such as intentionally disregarding safety regulations, as in
Valenzuela, does not deserve the limited liability that the Act
provides and should be held liable as a tortfeasor. Rather than
allowing the exception to remain an ineffective remedy for injured
employees, this Recent Development argues that the solution lies in
discarding the current standard used to evaluate whether employer
misconduct falls outside the Act in favor of a gross negligence
standard. Requiring that injured employees allege their injury was
caused by the gross negligence of their employer will ensure that
cases such as Valenzuela can survive summary judgment and that
employers will not continue to avoid liability for tortious misconduct
6. See Mark McGrath, Commentary: N.C. Appellate Courts' Treatment of Woodson
Amounts to Reversal, N.C. LAW. WKLY., Oct. 22, 2007, at 3 (reviewing the appellate
history of Woodson claims).
7. - N.C. App. -, 700 S.E.2d 76 (2010).
8. Id. at -, 700 S.E.2d at 79.
9. Id.
10. See McGrath, supra note 6, at 3; infra note 109.
11. Valenzuela, - N.C. App. at -_, 700 S.E.2d at 79-80.
12. Id.
13. See Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 342, 407 S.E.2d 222, 229 (1991).
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that was never meant to be protected by workers' compensation
legislation.
Analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the facts and
holding of Valenzuela. Part II briefly discusses the history and social
policy behind workers' compensation legislation and explores the
conception and development of the judicially created exceptions to
the Act's exclusivity provisions leading to the Woodson exception, as
well as the Woodson v. Rowland case. Part II then turns to the
confusion surrounding the substantial certainty standard and the
current understanding (or misunderstanding) of the standard. Part III
suggests that the reasoning behind the adoption of the substantial
certainty standard was not grounded in sound policy or fact and
argues that the confusion in the courts surrounding this standard has
made the Woodson claim an illusory cause of action. Next, this Part
suggests gross negligence as a new, workable standard that
encompasses the social policy behind workers' compensation
legislation and the goals of deterrence and culpability that underlie
the exceptions to the exclusivity provisions of the Act. Finally, Part
IV outlines guidelines based on the Restatement (Third) of Torts for
applying gross negligence in an employer-employee context. This Part
concludes that even under the substantial certainty standard, the
Valenzuela family's claim should have survived summary judgment,
adding support to the proposition that a new standard is required in
order to protect North Carolina workers and accomplish the policy
goals behind Woodson.
I. VALENZUELA V. PALLET EXPRESS, INC.

On October 2, 2007, seventeen-year-old Nery Castafteda
Valenzuela was killed while working for Pallet Express in
Greensboro, North Carolina.' n Nery was a documented, non-English
speaking Guatemalan immigrant with only a fourth-grade
education.15 On the day he died, Nery was working on a palletshredding machine called a "Horizontal Hog Shredder,"' 6 which

crushes and grinds wooden pallets into mulch.' 7 He was assigned to
this job by his employer even though federal and state law forbade a

14. Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 4, Valenzuela, _ N.C. App. -, 700 S.E.2d 76 (2010)
(No. COA10-87).
15. Id.
16. Id. Pallet Express specializes in the manufacture, repair, and disposal of wooden
pallets. See PALLET EXPRESS, INC., www.palletexpress.com (last visited Feb. 25, 2012).
17. Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief, supra note 14, at 5.
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child of seventeen to operate such power equipment."s Nery and a coworker were scheduled to work on the Hog Shredder with a
supervisor present, but the supervisor did not arrive for the three
o'clock shift.19 Unsupervised, Nery and the co-worker began feeding
pallets into the Hog Shredder, and soon after the beginning of their
shift, the co-worker left Nery alone at the running machine in order
to retrieve a forklift to assist them."0 When the co-worker returned,
the Hog Shredder was still running, but Nery was gone.2" Nery's
remains were soon discovered on the discharge end of the Hog
Shredder.22
The North Carolina Occupational Health and Safety
Administration ("NCOSHA") immediately conducted a full
investigation and cited Pallet Express with eleven separate violations
based on the work conditions present when Nery was killed.2 3 Pallet
Express was cited for allowing an underage employee to work on the
Hog Shredder, for operating the Hog Shredder without suitable
lockout/tagout systems, and for operating the Hog Shredder without
personnel trained in lockout/tagout procedure. 24 Most egregiously,
Pallet Express was cited for the missing safety guards at the staging
area, in-feed rollers, and mulch discharge conveyors on the Hog
Shredder. 5 In fact, the company president admitted that he ordered
the safety guard fitted near the Hog Shredder's wood-crushing mouth
to be removed during the machine's installation five years earlier in
order to increase productivity.2 6

18. Id. at 7.
19. Id. at 8.
20. Id. at 9.
21. Id. at 10.
22. Id.
700 S.E.2d 76, 78 (2010);
23. Valenzuela v. Pallet Express, Inc., _ N.C. App . .
Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief, supra note 14, at 10.
24. Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief, supra note 14, at 10-11. Lockout/tagout are safety
procedures mandated by the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act and enforced by
the N.C. Department of Labor to prevent injury to employees caused by an "unexpected
energization or startup of ... equipment." OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH Div.,
N.C. DEP'T OF LABOR, A GUIDE TO THE CONTROL OF HAZARDOUS ENERGY iv, 3
(2011), http://www.nclabor.com/osha/etta/indguide/ig27.pdf. Although the manufacturer of
the Hog Shredder warned against operating the machinery in the absence of personnel
validly certified in NCOSHA lockout/tagout procedures, there was no such person present
at the Hog Shredder on the day Nery was killed, and there was no procedure in place to
ensure proper supervision at the Hog Shredder. Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief, supra note 14,
at 7.
25. Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief, supra note 14, at 10.
26. Id. at 6. A former NCOSHA director gave testimony that he had never seen a
company president testify that he had ordered the manufacturer-required safety guards
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The Valenzuela family filed a wrongful death action, alleging
that Pallet Express:
1) removed safety guards from the shredder which sacrificed
employee safety for increased production; 2) assigned an
underage employee to work on heavy equipment in violation of
State and federal law; 3) failed to provide Nery with proper
training on the shredder; and 4) failed to ensure that trained
personnel were present when the shredder was operated.27

Pallet Express moved for summary judgment, asserting that because
there were no witnesses to the accident, the plaintiff failed to meet
the burden of proof required for a Woodson claim.28 The trial court
agreed, granting summary judgment to Pallet Express, and the
Valenzuela family appealed.2 9

In a brief opinion, the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed
summary judgment in favor of Pallet Express.3' Despite
acknowledging Pallet Express's assignment of an underage, untrained

employee to operate power machinery in contravention of federal
and state law and the intentional removal of the manufacturerinstalled safety guards on the Hog Shredder, the court found the facts
insufficient to support the inference that Pallet Express "knew [its]
actions were substantially certain to cause Nery's serious injury or
death."3 1 The family was thereby relegated to accepting only the
32
limited compensation available under the Act.

removed on operable machinery during his fifty years of workplace safety experience. Id.
at 12.
27. Valenzuela, _N.C.App. at -, 700 S.E.2d at 79.
28. Id. at -, 700 S.E.2d at 78. Among the alternate theories of the cause of Nery's
death advanced by Pallet Express were that Nery was a victim of homicide, committed
suicide, or fell into the Hog Shredder unconscious after being struck in the head.
Defendants-Appellees' Brief at 19-20, Valenzuela, _ N.C. App. _, 700 S.E.2d 76 (2010)
(No. COA10-87). At any rate, the lack of a witness to the accident should go to causation,
not to whether Pallet Express had knowledge that such misconduct was substantially
certain to cause injury or death.
29. Valenzuela, - N.C. App. at-, 700 S.E.2d at 78.
30. Id. at -, 700 S.E.2d at 79-80.
31. Id.
32. See id.at __,700 S.E.2d at 78. Generally, the benefits that an injured employee
receives under the Act are based on the employee's "average weekly wage." LEONARD T.
JERNIGAN, JR., NORTH CAROLINA WORKERS' COMPENSATION: LAW AND PRACTICE,
WITH FORMS § 11:1, at 109 (4th ed. 2004); see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(5) (2011). Death

benefits are typically paid for 400 weeks at a rate of two-thirds the decedent employee's
average weekly wage. § 97-38; JERNIGAN, JR., supra, § 15.1, at 159-60.
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The unfortunate decision in Valenzuela is neither surprising nor
unique.33 As a result of the confusion surrounding the misunderstood
and poorly defined substantial certainty standard,34 Woodson claims
repeatedly fail in North Carolina appellate courts, typically through
affirmation of the trial courts' grant of summary judgment in favor of
the defendant employer.35 The result in Valenzuela demonstrates that
North Carolina courts have lost sight of the purpose, spirit, and policy
behind both workers' compensation legislation and the Woodson
opinion, thereby allowing an important substantive right to become
an impotent remedy for injured employees. Rather than squandering
an opportunity to protect North Carolina workers, the courts should
adopt a new standard that serves both the original social goal behind
worker's compensation legislation and the sound policy of disallowing
employers engaged in egregious misconduct from hiding behind the
Act and evading liability.
II. EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCLUSIVITY PROVISION OF WORKERS'
COMPENSATION IN NORTH CAROLINA

In order to understand why Valenzuela should have been
decided differently, it is necessary to first discuss its background: the
history of workers' compensation legislation and the case law from
which the Woodson claim emerged; the evolution, distortion, and
current understanding of the Woodson substantial certainty standard;

33. See, e.g., Pendergrass v. Child Care, Inc., 333 N.C. 233, 238-40, 424 S.E.2d 391,
394-95 (1993) (holding that employer knowledge of unguarded dangerous machine parts
in violation of OSHA standards fails to support an inference of intent sufficient to satisfy a
Woodson claim); Regan v. Amerimark Bldg. Prods., Inc., 127 N.C. App. 225,228-29, 489
S.E.2d 421, 424 (1997) (concluding that evidence of a previous OSHA violation for an
unguarded machine is insufficient to support Woodson claim), affd 347 N.C. 665, 495
S.E.2d 378 (1998); Kolbinsky v. Paramount Homes, Inc., 126 N.C. App. 533, 535, 485
S.E.2d 900, 902 (1997) (concluding that evidence of an employer directing an employee's
use of circular saw with knowledge that the safety guards had been removed in violation of
OSHA standards is insufficient to support a Woodson claim), discretionary review denied,
347 N.C. 276, 493 S.E.2d 457 (1997). The Valenzuela court cited Kolbinsky in support of its
affirmation of summary judgment in favor of Pallet Express. Valenzuela, _ N.C. App. at
_,

700 S.E.2d at 79-80.

34. See infra Part II.C.
35. See, e.g., Mickles v. Duke Power Co., 342 N.C. 103, 105, 110-11, 463 S.E.2d 206,
208, 211 (1995) (reinstating the trial court's summary judgment order in favor of the
defendant employer where the employee fell to his death as a result of equipment that the
employer failed to replace after becoming aware that it was defective); Kolbinsky, 126
N.C. App. at 534-36, 485 S.E.2d at 901-02 (affirming summary judgment in favor of the
employer where an underage employee's hand was partially severed as a result of the lack
of safety guards on a circular saw); see McGrath, supra note 6, at 3; infra note 109.
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and how the standard is poorly suited to meet the policy goals behind
both workers' compensation and the Woodson opinion.
The rise of industrialism in the second half of the nineteenth
century was accompanied by an increase in workplace-related injury
and death.36 Employees injured at work could recover damages from

their employer at common law, with the right to a jury trial, but the
availability of defenses such as contributory negligence, negligence of
a co-employee, and assumption of risk made successful litigation
unlikely for the employee.37 Amid a growing concern for the hardship
imposed on the injured workers, states began passing legislation to
replace both employer liability statutes and common law actions
available to the employee.3 8
Following the lead of other states,3 9 North Carolina passed its

workers' compensation legislation in 1929.40 The new system, which
continues to govern all employer-employee relationships in North
Carolina, sought to balance the interests of employers and
employees. 4 Under the Act, employees lost their right to recover

damages, including compensation for pain and suffering, under
common law negligence, in exchange for quick, assured recovery for
work-related injuries.4 2 Employers, in return, relinquished the right to
common law defenses for the shield of limited liability.43 These tradeoffs embody the dual purpose of the Act: expeditious remedy for the
employee and limited liability for the employer."

36. Emily A. Spieler, PerpetuatingRisk? Workers' Compensation and the Persistence
of OccupationalInjuries, 31 HouS. L. REV. 119, 162 (1994).
37. See JERNIGAN, JR., supra note 32, § 1:1, at 1; Helga L. Leftwich, Note, The
Intentional-Tort Exception to the Workers' Compensation Exclusive Remedy Immunity
Provision:Woodson v. Rowland, 70 N.C. L. REV. 849, 858-60 (1994); John Richard Owen,
Note, The North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act of 1994: A Step in the Direction of
Restoring Balance, 73 N.C. L. REV. 2502, 2504-05 (1995).
38. Spieler, supra note 36, at 166-68.
39. JERNIGAN, JR., supra note 32, § 1:1, at 2; Spieler, supra note 36, at 168.
40. See North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 120, 1929 N.C. Sess. Laws
117 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -101 (2011)); JERNIGAN, JR.,
supra note 32, § 1:1, at 1.
41. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-3; JERNIGAN, JR., supra note 32, § 1:1, at 2.
42. JERNIGAN, JR., supra note 32, § 1:1, at 2; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.1 ("If the
employee and the employer are subject to and have complied with [the Act] ... the rights
and remedies herein granted to the employee ... shall exclude all other rights and
remedies....").
43. JERNIGAN, JR., supra note 32, § 1:1, at 2.
44. See Barnhardt v. Yellow Cab Co., 266 N.C. 419, 427, 146 S.E.2d 479, 484 (1966)
("The purpose of [workers' compensation] ... is not only to provide a swift and certain
remedy to an injured workman, but also to insure a limited and determinate liability for
employers.").
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The exclusive remedy provision is an important facet of the Act
because it makes clear that, generally, recovery under the Act is the
sole remedy available to injured employees. 45 Provided the employer
and employee are subject to the Act and have complied with its
provisions, employees are precluded from seeking other rights and
remedies available at common law46 and must settle claims with the
Industrial Commission in lieu of a trial court.47 Thus, an injured
worker's claim must fall into a common law exception in order to
bring a civil suit against an employer or co-employee for injuries
sustained at work. 4 Since compensation under the Act is limited, the
exceptions that permit claims to fall outside the Act's limited remedy
are important rights for workers because they provide an opportunity
for damages beyond what compensation under the Act will allow.
A. Evolution of the Woodson Claim: Pleasant v. Johnson and

Barrino v. Radiator Specialty Co.
North Carolina courts sought to ameliorate the harshness of the
restrictions on employee recovery and the immunity shielding
employers by carving out several significant exceptions to the
exclusivity provision of the Act that protected fellow employees and
employers from common law negligence suits.49 Decades ago, North
Carolina courts first disallowed the Act to shield employers50 and
45. Section 97-10.1 of the General Statutes of North Carolina provides:
If the employee and the employer are subject to and have complied with the
provision of this Article, then the rights and remedies herein granted to the
employee, his dependants, next of kin, or personal representative shall exclude all
other rights and remedies of the employee, his dependants, next of kin, or
representative as against the employer at common law or otherwise on account of
such injury or death.
For a more thorough discussion of the exclusive remedy provision of the Act, see
JERNIGAN, JR., supra note 32, § 10.1, at 97-100.
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.1.
47. See § 97-91 ("All questions arising under [the Act] ... shall be determined by the
Commission....").
48. See § 97-10.1.
49. See § 97-9 ("[An employer] or those conducting his business shall only be liable to
any employee for personal injury or death by accident to the extent and in the manner
herein specified."); Andrews v. Peters, 55 N.C. App. 124, 126, 284 S.E.2d 748, 749-50
(1981), discretionaryreview denied, 305 N.C. 395, 290 S.E.2d 364 (1982) (stating that the
Supreme Court of North Carolina has interpreted section 97-9 as providing immunity to
co-employees from common law liability).
50. See Warner v. Leder, 234 N.C. 727, 733-34, 69 S.E.2d 6, 10 (1952) ("It would be
against sound reason to allow the employer deliberately to batter his helper, and then
compel the worker to accept moderate workmen's compensation benefits, either from his
insurance carrier or from himself as self-insurer." (quoting SAMUEL B. HOROVITz,
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fellow employees"' from liability caused by intentional acts of harm.

These courts based their decisions on public policy and the legislative
intent behind the Act, concluding "that an intentional tort is not the
type of 'industrial accident' to which our legislature intended to give a
co-employee immunity."52
However, the question remained whether injuries caused by
intentional actions not necessarily meant to cause deliberate injury
fell outside of the exclusivity provision of the Act. Based on the
purpose behind workers' compensation legislation and sound public
53
policy, the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Pleasantv. Johnson
answered affirmatively and extended the exception to the Act's
exclusive remedy provision by giving an injured employee the ability
to recover from a fellow employee for "willful, wanton and reckless
negligence." 54
In Pleasant, the plaintiff was injured when the defendant co-

employee struck him with a truck while trying to scare him by
blowing the horn.55 The Pleasant court began its analysis by

acknowledging the social policy and purpose behind the Act: injured
employees should be provided prompt, guaranteed benefits for workrelated injuries caused by the negligence of the employer, and that
cost should be borne by the employers and ultimately passed along to

336 (1944) (internal
quotation marks omitted))), overruled by Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d
222 (1991), and Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244 (1985); Essick v.
Lexington, 232 N.C. 200, 210, 60 S.E.2d 106, 113 (1950) ("[A] vicious assault by a fellow
workman acting as alter ego of the employer was not within the contemplation of the Act
and... confer[s] no immunity.").
51. Daniels v. Swofford, 55 N.C. App. 555, 556, 561-62, 286 S.E.2d 582, 583, 585-86
(1982) (holding that the exclusivity provision of the Act did not bar an injured employee
from bringing a claim against the employer's corporate president for assault for kicking
her from behind); see Andrews, 55 N.C. App. at 127, 284 S.E.2d at 750; Wesley v. Lea, 252
N.C. 540, 545, 114 S.E.2d 350, 354 (1960) ("[T]o take the case out of the Workmen's
Compensation Act the injury to an employee by a co-employee must be intentional."),
overruled by Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991), and Pleasant v.
Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244 (1985).
52. Andrews, 55 N.C. App. at 127, 284 S.E.2d at 750 ("To hold otherwise is to remove
responsibility from the co-employee for his intentional conduct."). The court also held that
previous recovery under the Act did not preclude the plaintiff from seeking recovery
under common law intentional tort, concluding that such a rule would further insulate a
tortfeasor from his tortious conduct. Id. at 130, 284 S.E.2d at 751-52; see Warner, 234 N.C.
at 733-34, 69 S.E.2d at 10; Essick, 232 N.C. at 210, 60 S.E.2d at 113; Daniels, 55 N.C. App.
at 556, 561-62, 286 S.E.2d at 583, 585-86.
53. 312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244 (1985).
54. Id. at 715, 325 S.E.2d at 248.
55. Id. at 711, 325 S.E.2d at 246.
INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS

2012]

VALENZUELA v. PALLET EXPRESS, INC.

893

consumers. 56 Next, the court noted that willful injuries need not

always be accompanied by an intent to injure, and that "wanton and
reckless conduct" may also suffice.57 The court cited the example of
second-degree murder as an illustration of an area of the law where

wanton and reckless misconduct is sufficient to supply intent. 58
Importantly, the court noted that punitive damages have been
permitted by North Carolina courts in other contexts involving
wanton and reckless 59 conduct because that type of misconduct can be

deterred, unlike simple negligent conduct.' Thus, the court surmised,
these considerations support the conclusion that injuries caused by a
co-employee's wanton and reckless
behavior should fall outside the
61
exclusivity provisions of the Act.

By permitting recovery for injuries sustained as the result of a coemployee's reckless conduct, the injured employee can both collect
compensation under the Act and recover from the co-employee in

tort. 62 However, the Pleasantcourt was unbothered by the availability
of dual avenues for recovery for the injured employee, finding
justification for this result in the mechanics of the Act. 63 First, any
recovery received by the injured employee in tort can reduce the
liability of employers or insurers who are innocent of wrongdoing.'
56. See id. at 712, 325 S.E.2d at 246-47 ("The most important feature of the typical
workers' compensation scheme is that the employee and his dependents give up their
common law right to sue the employer for negligence in exchange for limited but assured
benefits." (emphasis added)).
57. Id. at 715, 325 S.E.2d at 248. The court labeled intent supported by such
misconduct "constructive intent." Id. ("Constructive intent to injure exists where conduct
threatens the safety of others and is so reckless or manifestly indifferent to the
consequences that a finding of willfulness and wantonness equivalent in spirit to actual
intent is justified.").
58. Id.
59. The Pleasant court defined "wanton conduct" as "an act manifesting a reckless
disregard for the rights and safety of others." Id. at 714, 325 S.E.2d at 248 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The court stated that the term "reckless" was merely a
synonym for "wanton" when used in this context and the terms are often used in
combination to describe "wanton" conduct. Id.
60. Id. at 715, 717, 325 S.E.2d at 248-49.
61. Id. at 716-17, 325 S.E.2d at 249-50. The court conceded that courts in other states,
as well as courts in North Carolina, had explicitly declined the treatment of reckless
conduct as an exception to co-employee immunity under workers' compensation acts in
the past. Id. at 715-16, 325 S.E.2d at 248-49. Yet, the court found its own reasoning more
compelling. Id. at 718, 325 S.E.2d at 250 ("It would be a travesty of justice and logic to
permit a worker to injure a co-employee through [reckless] conduct, and then compel the
injured co-employee to accept moderate benefits under the Act.").
62. Id. at 717, 325 S.E.2d at 249.
63. Id. at 717, 325 S.E.2d at 249-50.
64. Id.; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2 (2011) (granting subrogation rights to workers'
compensation insurance carriers from third-party tortfeasors).
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Next, the co-employee is not exposed to dual liability because the coemployee does not contribute to the workers' compensation fund or
participate in defending the workers' compensation claim.65 Thus, the
court calmed fears that an injured employee could receive a windfall
or that a tortious co-employee could be exposed to double liability.
The Pleasant court's reasoning was simple, but its importance
cannot be overstated. Injuries caused by simple negligence,
misconduct which cannot be effectively deterred by punitive
damages, is and should be covered by workers' compensation, but
misconduct that can be deterred under threat of damages in tort
should not be protected under the Act.66

The Supreme Court of North Carolina in Pleasant specifically
declined to decide whether the reckless conduct of an employer
should fall outside the exclusivity provision of the Act 6 7-an issue
that the court ruled on five years later in Barrino v. RadiatorSpecialty
Co.68 In Barrino, Lora Ann Barrino was severely burned after an
explosion and fire at a manufacturing plant owned by Radiator
Specialty Company and later died as a result of those injuries. 69
Radiator Specialty Company was accused of both failing to provide a
safe working atmosphere and purposely creating a dangerous work
environment, allegedly committing reckless acts which included,
among others: using liquefied petroleum gases without gaining proper
state inspection or approval; covering the meters that were installed
to detect unsafe vapor levels; disengaging the alarm systems designed
to warn employees of those hazardous vapor levels; and instructing
70
employees to ignore the sounding alarms and to continue working.
After collecting workers' compensation death benefits, Barrino's
parents filed a civil action against Radiator Specialty Company
seeking damages for the "reckless, wanton, willful and intentional
acts" that led to their daughter's death.71 The defendant moved for
summary judgment, asserting the action was barred by the exclusivity
65. Pleasant,312 N.C. at 717, 325 S.E.2d at 249.
66. Id. at 717-18, 325 S.E.2d at 250.
67. Id. at 717, 325 S.E.2d at 250.
68. 315 N.C. 500, 340 S.E.2d 295 (1986), overruledby Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C.
330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991). Barrino was not a case of first impression for the Supreme
Court of North Carolina. The Barrino court noted that just two years earlier, it held
workers' compensation benefits to be the exclusive remedy for injuries resulting from an
employer's gross negligence in Freeman v. SCM Corp., 311 N.C. 294, 295-96, 316 S.E.2d
81, 82 (1984) (per curiam). Barrino,315 N.C. at 509, 340 S.E.2d at 301.
69. Barrino,315 N.C. at 502, 340 S.E.2d at 297.
70. Id. at 503, 340 S.E.2d at 298.
71. Id. at 502-03, 340 S.E.2d at 297-98.
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provision of the Act.72 The trial court agreed, granting the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, and the North Carolina
Court of Appeals affirmed.7 3

The Supreme Court of North Carolina also affirmed, declining
the invitation to extend the holding in Pleasant to the misconduct of

an employer, holding instead that recovery under the Act is the
exclusive remedy for injuries sustained as a result of the willful,
wanton, and reckless negligence of an employer.74 The Barrino court
conclusively stated that the intentional tort exception to the

exclusivity provision requires a true intentional tort, and that
anything less remains an "accident" within the meaning of the Act.75
The Barrino opinion also emphasized that the Pleasant court's
justification based on the mechanics of the Act does not hold true in
the case of an employer because employers pay into the workers'
compensation system.7 6 Thus, an employer could be penalized a
second time by being forced to participate in a tort suit defense after
already taking part in the defense of a claim under the Act.77
Moreover, the court was concerned that an employer could be
exposed to greater liability than that under the Act, notwithstanding a

reduction of tort liability for workers' compensation benefits already
received by the injured employee. 78 The Barrinocourt then used this
reasoning as a justification for strict adherence to a rule disallowing

any cause of action for misconduct less than true intent to harm.79
Justice Harry Martin forcefully dissented, rejecting the view that
the issue was whether the holding in Pleasant should be extended to
provide a remedy for willful, wanton, or reckless acts of an employer.

72. Id. at 505, 340 S.E.2d at 299. Radiator Specialty Company also asserted that the
action was barred because the plaintiffs made a binding election to accept workers'
compensation benefits, thus foreclosing any available common law action. Id. The Barrino
court seized this chance to reemphasize that there was no election for the plaintiffs to
make-the injuries sustained by Lora Ann Barrino were covered under the Act, thus
workers' compensation was their exclusive path of recovery. Id. at 510, 340 S.E.2d at 30102.
73. Id. at 505, 340 S.E.2d at 299.
74. Id. at 511, 513, 515, 340 S.E.2d at 302-05.
75. Id. at 507, 340 S.E.2d at 300 ("Since the legal justification for the common-law
action is the nonaccidental character of the injury from the defendant employer's
standpoint, the common-law liability of the employer cannot, under the almost unanimous
rule, be stretched to include accidental injuries caused by the gross, wanton, wilful,
deliberate, intentional,reckless, culpable, or malicious negligence, breach of statute, or other
misconduct of the employer short of genuine intentionalinjury.").
76. Id. at 511-13, 340 S.E.2d at 302-03.
77. Id. at 512, 340 S.E.2d at 303.
78. Id.
79. Id.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

Rather, he believed the issue to be whether a grant of summary
judgment was appropriate regarding the defendant employer's
subjective intent, given the plaintiffs evidence." Since the issue of
intent establishes an injured employee's right to bring an action
against an employer falling outside the exclusivity provision of the
Act, Justice Martin viewed the question of intent to be a material
fact.81 Thus, disposal of the action on summary judgment was
inappropriate.82 Justice Martin also departed from the Barrino
majority in his view on the definition of intent for purposes of
exclusivity of the Act by stating: "Intent is broader than a desire to
bring about physical results. It must extend not only to those
consequences which are desired, but also to those which the actor
believes are substantially certain to follow from what he does." 83
More noteworthy than his broader definition of intent was
Justice Martin's nod to the reasoning of the Pleasant court and his
connection between the creation of an effective deterrent and the
overuse of summary judgment. First, he approved of the deterrent
objective averred in Pleasantand warned against disposal of issues of
material fact, such as the intent of the employer, through procedural
devices

because "we

should be ...

concerned with deterring

intentional employer conduct which is likely to endanger the lives and
safety of ...

workers."'

Distressed with the consequences of

permitting employers to use the Act as a shield against intentional
wrongs, he also predicted that employers would engage in an
economic balancing test-"weigh[ing] the ... costs of compliance

with safety regulations against the costs of workers' compensation"and emphasized that the courts must exercise caution in disposing of
these actions on summary judgment if the likelihood of a tort suit is to
act as an effective deterrent.8 5
Despite Justice Martin's compelling argument to the contrary,
the court remained unconvinced and the question appeared to be
answered-employees injured by intentional acts of the employer
80. Id. at 517, 340 S.E.2d at 305 (Martin, J., dissenting). Justice Martin believed that
the question of whether an employer may be sued for willful, wanton, or reckless conduct
should be set aside because he considered the conduct of the defendant employer in
Barrino to have well exceeded the reckless conduct of the co-employee in Pleasant,thus
not decisive of the question at issue in Barrino.Id. at 521, 340 S.E.2d at 307.
81. Id. at 517, 340 S.E.2d at 305.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 518, 340 S.E.2d at 305 (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 8 (4th ed. 1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
84. Id. at 519, 340 S.E.2d at 306.
85. Id.
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were limited to workers' compensation benefits absent an allegation
of intentional injury. 86 It would take five years, and a seemingly less

compelling set of facts than in Barrino,for North Carolina courts to
adopt a broader definition of intent in Woodson v. Rowland.87
B.

Woodson v. Rowland

In Woodson, Thomas Sprouse, an employee of Morris Rowland
Utility, Inc., was killed when a trench in which he was laying pipe
collapsed, burying him and another worker. 8 The employer had

ordered Sprouse to work in the fourteen-foot trench in disregard of
Occupational

Safety

and

Health

Act

of

North

Carolina

("OSHANC") regulations that mandated the use of trench boxes as a
safety precaution, despite the availability of a trench box at the
construction site.89 The administrator of Sprouse's estate brought a

wrongful death action, alleging Sprouse's death was caused by the
intentional misconduct of his employer.9" The trial court granted

summary judgment in favor of the defendant employer, concluding
that Sprouse's death was an "accident" within the meaning of the Act
and therefore covered under the Act's exclusive remedy provision.9'

The court of appeals affirmed.9'
The Supreme Court of North Carolina, however, found the
plaintiff's evidence of intentional misconduct sufficient to survive
summary judgment under a broader definition of intent than
previously allowed in Barrino and reversed, thus carving out the
Woodson exception to the exclusivity provision of the Act.93 Just as

86. Id. at 511-13, 340 S.E.2d at 302-03.
87. 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991); see also Leftwich, supra note 37, at 851-58
(discussing the Woodson opinion).
88. Id. at 334-36, 407 S.E.2d at 224-26. The other worker was buried up to his torso
and survived the trench collapse. Id.
89. Id. at 335-36, 407 S.E.2d at 225-26. A trench box is a large, metal structure
designed to be placed in an excavated trench in order to shore the walls, protecting
workers from being buried by the collapse of the soil. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY &
HEALTH Div., N.C. DEP'T OF LABOR, A GUIDE TO THE OSHA EXCAVATIONS
STANDARD v, 4-5 (2011), available at http://www.nclabor.com/osha/etta/indguide/igl4.pdf.
90. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 334, 337, 407 S.E.2d at 224, 226. The plaintiff delayed her
case before the Industrial Commission and the collection of benefits under the Act for fear
that the defendant would raise an "election of remedies" defense and defeat her claim. Id
at 336,407 S.E.2d at 226.
91. Id. at 336-37, 407 S.E.2d at 226. For a discussion of the term "accident" as it
pertains to workers' compensation, see infra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
92. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 336,407 S.E.2d at 226.
93. Id. at 337, 341, 407 S.E.2d at 226, 229; see also Barrino v. Radiator Specialty Co.,
315 N.C. 500, 507, 340 S.E.2d 295, 300 (1986) (requiring actual intent to injure in order to
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Justice Martin had done six years earlier, the court embraced a
broader definition of intent as described in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts94 and expressly adopted Justice Martin's dissent in Barrino95:

Today we adopt the views of the Barrino dissent. When an
employer intentionally engages in misconduct knowing it is
substantially certain to cause serious injury or death to
employees and an employee is injured or killed by that
misconduct, that employee, or the personal representative of
the estate in case of death, may pursue a civil action against the
employer. Such misconduct is tantamount to an intentional tort,
and civil actions based thereon are not barred by the exclusivity
provisions of the Act.96

This new substantial certainty standard held employers liable for
conduct that does not rise to the level of true intent to harm,97 yet still
failed to adopt the lower Pleasant standard that held co-employees
liable for willful, wanton, or reckless conduct.98
The Woodson court found justification for the expansion of the
definition of intent in statutory construction based on legislative
intent and public policy. The court first noted that the purpose of the
Act was to "provide[] for an injured employee's certain and sure
recovery without having to prove employer negligence,"99 further
stating that it was not the objective of the legislature to shield an
employer from liability for intentional torts that injure or kill an
employee. 100 The court believed this new standard stayed true to the
intent of the Act in which the legislature sought to strike the right
balance between the interests of both employers and employees. 1 '
The court also believed that the new standard would continue to both
encourage workplace safety and provide an effective deterrent for
misconduct that creates unsafe work conditions. 2

support a civil action outside the exclusivity provision of the Act), overruled by Woodson
v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330,407 S.E.2d 222 (1991).
94. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 341, 407 S.E.2d at 229; Barrino,315 N.C. at 518, 340 S.E.2d
at 305; see supra note 83 and accompanying text.
95. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 340,407 S.E.2d at 228.
96. Id. at 340-41, 407 S.E.2d at 228 (emphasis added).
97. See id.; Michael Doran, The Substantial Certainty Exception to Workers'
Compensation, 17 CAMPBELL L. REv. 413, 414-15 (1995) (discussing the standard in
Woodson and its subsequent misapplication in the years immediately following Woodson).
98. See Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 716, 325 S.E.2d 244, 249 (1985).
99. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 338,407 S.E.2d at 227 (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 338-39, 407 S.E.2d at 227.
101. Id. at 342, 407 S.E.2d at 229.
102. Id.
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The court made a point to acknowledge that the reasoning in
Pleasantfor allowing the availability of a cause of action for reckless

conduct against co-employees was still sound, but distinguished the
facts in Pleasant from instances in which an employer engages in
misconduct that rises to a degree higher than ordinary negligence. 10 3

Much like the Barrinocourt, the Woodson court stated that since coemployees do not contribute to workers' compensation funds, but
employers do, this difference warranted a requirement for a higher
degree of culpability to hold employers liable for misconduct outside
the provisions of the Act. 4
C.

The Substantial Uncertainty Caused by the Substantial Certainty
Standard
A successful Woodson claim requires "(1) misconduct by the

employer; (2) intentionally engaged in; (3) with the knowledge that
the misconduct is substantially certain to cause serious injury or death
to an employee; and (4) that employee is injured as a consequence of
the misconduct."' 1 5 The debate over the precise meaning

of

academic106

substantially certain in the third element has raged in the
and legal communities,0 7 and in North Carolina's own appellate court
system'0 since the Woodson opinion was issued just over twenty
years ago. Regrettably, the confusion surrounding the substantial
certainty standard has contributed to the failure of nearly all

Woodson claims that have made it to the North Carolina appellate
courts, usually through affirming summary judgment in favor of the
employer.309
103. Id.
104. Id. ("Co-employees do not finance or otherwise directly participate in workers'
compensation programs; employers, on the other hand, do. This distinction alone justifies
the higher 'substantialcertainty' threshold for civil recovery againstemployers." (emphasis
added) (internal citation omitted)).
105. Pastva v. Naegele Outdoor Adver., Inc., 121 N.C. App. 656, 659, 468 S.E.2d 491,
494 (1996), discretionaryreview denied, 343 N.C. 308, 471 S.E.2d 74 (1996).
106. See, e.g., Doran, supra note 97 passim (discussing the misapplication of the
standard in the years following Woodson); David L. Lambert, Comment, From Andrews
to Woodson and Beyond: The Development of the Intentional Tort Exception to the
Exclusive Remedy Provision-Rescuing North Carolina Workers from Treacherous
Waters, 20 N.C. CENT. L.J. 164, 189-92 (1992) (arguing that even the facts of Woodson do
not meet the substantial certainty standard).
107. See McGrath, supra note 6, at 6 (discussing the failure of Woodson claims through
a "distorting and narrowing" of the standard).
108. See infra notes 110-28 and accompanying text.
109. See McGrath, supra note 6, at 6-7. A thorough search of both Lexis and Westlaw
reveals only two North Carolina Court of Appeals cases where Woodson claims brought
by injured employees in which the trial court's summary judgment orders in favor of the
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Indeed, the "tortured path" of the substantial certainty standard
began soon after the Woodson claim was created."' Eighteen months
following the Woodson decision, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina mischaracterized and misapplied the standard it articulated
in its first attempt to apply it in Pendergrassv. Card Care, Inc."' by
asserting that, for a successful Woodson claim, "[t]he conduct must be
so egregious as to be tantamount to an intentional tort."1 2 The
Pendergrass court analyzed the misconduct of two co-employees,
failing to find that their behavior rose to the level of the Pleasant
standard and concluding that since "[t]he plaintiffs rely on the same
allegations of negligence to support their [Woodson] claim against
[the defendant employer] that they relied upon in their claim against
[the co-employees]," the employer's misconduct could not therefore
be characterized as leading to a "substantial certainty of injury"
sufficient to support a Woodson claim." 3 However, simply by not
analyzing the misconduct of the co-employees under the Pleasant
standard separately from that of the employer under the Woodson
standard, the Pendergrasscourt failed to correctly apply Woodson." 4
As one commentator has noted, although tortious behavior can be
viewed as a continuum, the Pleasant and Woodson standards are
nevertheless "separate theories of liability [that] must be analyzed
independently."" 5
Soon after Pendergrass,in Dunleavy v. Yates Construction Co.,116
a case involving a trench cave-in similar to Woodson, the court of

defendant employer were reversed; however, in both cases, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina reversed the court of appeals, agreeing with the trial courts that summary
judgment was indeed appropriate. Whitaker v. Town of Scotland Neck, 154 N.C. App. 660,
665, 572 S.E.2d 812, 815 (2002), reh'g granted, 356 N.C. 696, 579 S.E.2d 104 (2003), rev'd,
357 N.C. 552, 597 S.E.2d 665 (2003); Mickles v. Duke Power Co., 115 N.C. App. 624, 446
S.E.2d 369 (1994), rev'd 342 N.C. 103, 463 S.E.2d 206 (1995); see also McGrath, supra note
6, at 6-7 (discussing Whitaker and Mickles).
110. See McGrath, supra note 6, at 7 (discussing the history of Woodson claims in the
appellate courts and describing the Whitaker case's course through the court system as a
"tortured path").
111. 333 N.C. 233,424 S.E.2d 391 (1993) (affirming the trial court's dismissal for failure
to state a claim); see also McGrath, supra note 6, at 6-7 (discussing the supreme court's
treatment of the Woodson claim in Pendergrass).For a more thorough discussion of the
Pendergrasscase, see Doran, supra note 97, at 421-22.
112. Pendergrass v. Child Care, Inc., 333 N.C. 233, 239-40, 424 S.E.2d 391, 395 (1993);
see Doran, supra note 97, at 421-22.
113. Pendergrass,333 N.C. at 239-40, 424 S.E.2d at 395; see Doran, supra note 97, at
421-22.
114. Doran, supra note 97, at 421-22.
115. Id. at 422.
116. 114 N.C. App. 196,442 S.E.2d 53 (1994).
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appeals embarked on a lengthy factual comparison with Woodson,
failing to actually apply the substantial certainty test to the facts at
hand. 117
Several attempts by the North Carolina Court of Appeals to
explain the substantial certainty standard likewise have proved
unsuccessful. First, in Powell v. S & G Prestress Co.,118 the court
equated the Woodson standard to the "bomb-throwing" illustration
from the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
A throws a bomb into B's office for the purpose of killing B. A
knows that C, B's stenographer, is in the office. A has no desire
to injure C, but knows that this act is substantially certain to do
so. C is injured by the explosion. A is subject to liability to C for
an intentional tort. 119
While the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the
employer,1 20 Judge Wynn disagreed that summary judgment was

117. Id. at 198-99, 201, 442 S.E.2d at 54-56. The Dunleavy court, after noting that
"[t]he Woodson Court placed great emphasis on the extreme facts in [that case]," id. at
201, 442 S.E.2d at 55, affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employer after
systematically comparing the facts at hand to the facts in Woodson:
In Woodson, the employer had been cited four times in the previous six and a half
years for violating regulations governing trenching safety procedures; in the
instant case, the employer had one previous citation .... In Woodson, the
employer was at the job site when the accident occurred; in the instant case ...
[the foreman] had stopped by the site briefly the morning of the accident.... In
Woodson, a trench box was available for use on the day of the accident and the
employer chose not to use it; in the instant case, the employers had ordered trench
boxes for the site but they had not yet arrived. In Woodson, the employer knew
the trench had a depth of fourteen feet; in the instant case, employers' foreman...
believ[ed] that the crew would not complete enough work to exceed a depth of
five feet in the trench before he returned. Finally, in Woodson, the employer
consciously, intentionally and personally ordered the decedent to work in the
fourteen foot trench; in the instant case, [the foreman] did not consciously,
intentionally and personally order decedent to work in a portion of the trench ....
Based on the foregoing, we find that the conduct . .. did not rise to the level of
misconduct described in Woodson.
Id. at 201-02, 442 S.E.2d at 55-56. For a thorough analysis of the Dunleavy case, see
Doran, supranote 97, at 422-25.
118. 114 N.C. App. 319, 442 S.E.2d 143 (1994), abrogatedby Mickles v. Duke Power
Co., 342 N.C. 103, 463 S.E.2d 206 (1995) (disavowing the bomb-throwing illustration),
affd, 342 N.C. 182, 463 S.E.2d 79 (1995) (per curiam) (agreeing with the Mickles court's
rejection of the bomb-throwing illustration). In Powell, the decedent was an untrained,
twenty-two-year-old temporary employee who was crushed and killed by a crane while
performing construction work. Id. at 321-22, 442 S.E.2d at 144-45.
119. Id. at 325, 442 S.E.2d at 147 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A

illus. 1 (1965)).
120. Id. at 325-26, 442 S.E.2d at 147.
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appropriate given the plaintiff's evidence. 2' In his dissent, he
observed that the Woodson court simply established the substantial
certainty standard, without further defining it, and the majority's
a
bomb-throwing illustration from the Restatement (Second) "set[] 122
higher standard than that actually applied" by the Woodson court.
The next year, the Supreme Court of North Carolina, in apparent
agreement with Judge Wynn, renounced the bomb-throwing example
as an incorrect illustration of the Woodson standard, stating "[i]n the
above example, A is actually certain his act will injure or kill C. [But]
the Woodson exception does not require such actual certainty." 123
Following this decision, the court of appeals set out a second
time to articulate a more workable Woodson standard, this time
refining the Woodson opinion and its progeny into a multifactor test

121. Id. at 329-30,442 S.E.2d at 148-49 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 328, 442 S.E.2d at 148. The Restatement (Second) illustration was also cited,
in apparent agreement with Powell, by the court in a second case, Echols v. Zarn, Inc., 116
N.C. App. 364, 378, 448 S.E.2d 289, 297 (1994), discretionaryreview allowed, 339 N.C. 737,
454 S.E.2d 649 (1995), abrogatedby Mickles v. Duke Power Co., 342 N.C. 103, 463 S.E.2d
206 (1995).
123. Mickles, 342 N.C. at 110, 463 S.E.2d at 211; see also Powell, 342 N.C. at 183, 463
S.E.2d at 80 ("[A]s in Mickles ...we disavow the language of the Court of Appeals in its
decision in this case suggesting that Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A illus. 1 (1965) is
illustrative of the type of conduct required to satisfy the 'substantial certainty' test of
").In Pastva v. Naegele OutdoorAdver., Inc., 121 N.C. App. 656, 468 S.E.2d
Woodson ....
491 (1996), discretionaryreview denied, 343 N.C. 308, 471 S.E.2d 74 (1996), one year after
the supreme court rejected the bomb-throwing illustration, Judge Wynn again took the
opportunity to comment on the lack of guidance imparted by the supreme court in
Woodson. See id. at 660, 468 S.E.2d at 494 (Wynn, J.,concurring) ("ITihe opportunity
should not be lost to point out the continuing dilemma faced by our trial judges and
litigators in trying to assess what is needed to set forth a Woodson claim."). Noting that
the bench and bar have nothing more to guide them on the precise meaning of the
substantial certainty test other than the facts in Woodson, he urged the establishment of a
"more articulate standard of law which would lend itself to an application of facts needed
to overcome pretrial dismissal." Id. at 660-61, 468 S.E.2d at 494-95 ("[S]ince creating the
Woodson exception, the Court has consistently pointed out facts that do not establish a
Woodson claim. However, it remains an uncertainty as to what facts do allege a Woodson
claim sufficient to overcome pretrial dismissal."). Judge Wynn implored the Supreme
Court of North Carolina to do something, stating,
[O]ur Supreme Court could revisit Woodson and declare that the employer's
conduct in that case was indeed intentional conduct-an already established
exception to the Workers' Compensation Act. Regardless of which approach is
taken, any direction is better than the uncertainty that currently exists with the
state of the law on this issue.
Id. at 662, 468 S.E.2d at 495; see also McGrath, supra note 6, at 6 (discussing Judge
Wynn's frustration with the substantial certainty standard in his Pastva concurrence).
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in Wiggins v. Pelikan, Inc. 124 Once again, the supreme court rejected
the court of appeals' attempts to provide guideposts, stating that
"[t]he Woodson exception represents a narrow holding in a factspecific case, and its guidelines stand by themselves. ' 125 The court
further stated that "[t]his exception applies only in the most egregious
cases of employer misconduct."1

supreme court spoke on the

26

Wiggins was the last time the

matter, 27

thereby relegating trial courts

28
to comparing the facts at hand to the facts in Woodson.1
Given the lack of guidance by the Supreme Court of North
Carolina on the type of evidence sufficient to survive summary
judgment on a Woodson claim,129 it is not surprising that the
Valenzuela court summarily rejected the plaintiff's Woodson claim.
Herein lies the fundamental problem. In the face of a vague standard,
the only legal hook on which a plaintiff can hang a successful
argument is to demonstrate that his facts are exactly like those in
Woodson v. Rowland,13 ° and if the facts are not like those in
Woodson, a court may feel it has no choice but to grant a motion for

124. 132 N.C. App. 752, 756-58, 513 S.E.2d 829, 832-33 (1999), overruled in part by,
Whitaker v. Town of Scotland Neck, 357 N.C. 552, 597 S.E.2d 665 (2003). The six-factor
test was first established by the Wiggins court and summarized in a later case as follows:
(1) Whether the risk that caused the harm existed for a long period of time
without causing injury; (2) Whether the risk was created by a defective
instrumentality with a high probability of causing the harm at issue; (3) Whether
there was evidence the employer, prior to the accident, attempted to remedy the
risk that caused the harm; (4) Whether the employer's conduct which created the
risk violated state or federal work safety regulations; (5) Whether the defendantemployer created a risk by failing to adhere to an industry practice, even though
there was no violation of a state or federal safety regulation; and (6) Whether the
defendant-employer offered training in the safe behavior appropriate in the
context of the risk causing the harm.
Whitaker v. Town of Scotland Neck, 357 N.C. 552, 555-56, 597 S.E.2d 665, 667 (2003)
(quoting Wiggins, 132 N.C. App. at 756-58, 513 S.E.2d at 832-33) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (summarizing but ultimately rejecting the six-factor test as overbroad),
reh'g granted, 356 N.C. 696, 579 S.E.2d 104 (2003), rev'd, 357 N.C. 552, 597 S.E.2d 665
(2003).
125. Whitaker, 357 N.C. at 557, 597 S.E.2d at 668.
126. Id.
127. See Valenzuela v. Pallet Express, Inc.,

-

N.C. App.

-,

-,

700 S.E.2d 76, 78-79

(2010) (citing Whitaker for the Woodson standard); Ellis v. Int'l Harvester Co., 178 N.C.
App. 741, 2006 WL 2129709, at *4 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2006) (unpublished table
decision) (citing Whitaker as the most recent case addressing the substantial certainty
standard).
128. McGrath, supra note 6, at 6. For examples of this type of fact-comparison analysis,
see Dunleavy v. Yates Constr. Co., 114 N.C. App. 196,201-02,442 S.E.2d 53, 55-56 (1994),
and note 117 supra.
129. See supranotes 120-28 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., Whitaker, 357 N.C. at 557-58, 597 S.E.2d at 668-69.
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summary judgment in favor of the defendant employer. A standard
that consigns courts to employ a fact-based comparison with the
original opinion from which the standard came is no standard at all.
That the Woodson claim in Valenzuela failed under such damning
facts is a clear signal that the substantial certainty standard is
ineffective, and that a change must be made.
III. A NEW STANDARD
Numerous pleas for a more workable and understandable
standard have gone unanswered. 13 ' The substantial certainty
standard-yet to be adequately defined by the Supreme Court of
North Carolina-now stands as an insurmountable barrier that
plaintiffs strive in vain to overcome, making the Woodson claim an
illusory cause of action. Even if the substantial certainty standard
were attainable, it is not a standard that is easily understood.'32 This
confusion has effectively foreclosed the Woodson claim as a viable
option for injured employees because with so little guidance, a court
has almost no choice but to delve into fact-specific comparisons with
Woodson, which leads to wholesale disposal of claims on summary
judgment. Because Woodson claims are effectively no longer viable
claims in North Carolina, plaintiffs such as the Valenzuela family are
limited to the compensation the Act provides, a result that is contrary
to the social policy behind workers' compensation legislation, sound
public policy, and the intent of the Woodson court.
Since the substantial certainty standard has proved to be an
unworkable and thus unsuccessful attempt at creating a tangible
substantive right, the solution lies in using a clear, familiar standard
for evaluating employer misconduct that will fulfill the intent of the
Woodson court while continuing to balance the competing interests
behind workers' compensation legislation. The standard should be
gross negligence.
A.

Gross Negligence Createsa Distinct "Middle Ground"

The Supreme Court of North Carolina's own confusion and
misunderstanding of the precise meaning of substantial certainty is
the root of the problem. The court adopted an intent-based
standard,13 3 then later rejected this standard by disavowing the bomb131.
132.
133.
limited

See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.C and infra Part III.A.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. b (1965) ("Intent is not ...
to consequences which are desired. If the actor knows that the consequences are
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throwing illustration from the Restatement (Second) as exemplifying
actual intent, not substantial certainty."M Since the bomb-throwing
primary example of what is meant by
illustration is the Restatement's
"substantial certainty,"' 135 the supreme court was signaling either its
misunderstanding of substantial certainty, or its discomfort with
imposing such a high evidentiary burden on an injured employee.
Further, if the Restatement's own illustration of substantial certainty is

rejected by the court as requiring too much, there is nothing left to
the standard, and it is no longer clear what types of misconduct are
meant to fall outside the exclusivity of the Act.

The Woodson court plainly wanted to adopt a standard higher
than negligence but lower than actual intent136 and looked to the
Restatement (Second) and Prosser and Keeton for guidance which
would articulate a satisfactory middle-ground between those two
types of misconduct.137 However, the court's refusal to adopt the
"willful, wanton, and reckless" standard similar to that in Pleasantthe only middle-ground that is provided by the Restatement (Second)
and Prosser and Keeton' 3s -led the Woodson court to adopt instead a

standard that it misunderstood as a distinct middle ground.

Substantial certainty is not a distinct middle ground, it is intent. 39
Conduct based on a "conscious and reckless disregard for the safety

and rights of others" standard-what North Carolina courts call
"wanton conduct" or "gross negligence"° 40 -better reflects the

•..substantially certain,.., he is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce
the result.").
134. See Mickles v. Duke Power Co., 342 N.C. 103, 110, 463 S.E.2d 206, 211 (1995).
135. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A illus. 1 (1965).
136. See Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 344, 407 S.E.2d 222, 230 (1991) ("[Bjoth
courts and legislatures in ...other jurisdictions have rejected the proposition that actual
intent to harm is required for an employer's conduct to be actionable in tort and not
protected by the exclusivity provisions of workers' compensation. Our adoption of the
substantial certainty standard does the same."); see also supra Part II.C (discussing the
North Carolina appellate courts' disagreements, through published opinions, on both the
meaning of the substantial certainty standard and the level of intent required for a
successful Woodson claim).
137. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 341, 407 S.E.2d at 228-29.
138. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 34, at 212-14 (5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 cmts. f, g (1965);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM

§ 2 cmt. a (2010) (equating wanton and reckless conduct with reckless disregard for risk).
139. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965) ("The word 'intent' is used
...to denote that the actor.., believes that the consequences [of his act] are substantially
certain to result from it." (emphasis added)).
140. Yancey v. Lea, 354 N.C. 48, 53, 550 S.E.2d 155, 158 (2001) ("An act or conduct
rises to the level of gross negligence when the act is done purposely and with knowledge
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supreme court's desire to find this middle ground between negligent
and intentional conduct.
It is highly questionable whether even the facts in Woodson met
the substantial certainty standard."' While the defendant employer
had previously been cited numerous times for violating trenching
procedure, there was also evidence that prior experience allowed the
employer to recognize when dangerous trenching conditions
existed.' 42 The defendant employer and project supervisor also
testified that although a trenchbox was available, they believed the
soil conditions to be such that a cave-in was unlikely.143 Additionally,

the project supervisor at the worksite placed his own son in the same
trench where Thomas Sprouse was killed.'" In order to meet the
substantial certainty standard, the defendant employer and supervisor
would have had to have known for certain that the trench would
collapse, just as the bomb thrower is certain that the bomb will
explode and the unintended victim will be killed.145 It is highly
unlikely that the supervisor would have placed his son in a trench that
was certain to collapse. 146 Further, Judge Wynn acknowledged, 147 and

the supreme court later agreed, that the bomb-throwing illustration
set a higher bar than that which was applied in Woodson.'48 Since the
149
bomb-throwing illustration is what is meant by substantial certainty,
anything less must be gross negligence.

Gross negligence, defined as "wanton conduct done with
conscious or reckless disregard for the rights and safety of others,"' 5 °
has the advantage of being a familiar and clear standard in North
that such act is a breach of duty to others, i.e., a conscious disregard of the safety of
others.")
141. Lambert, supra note 106, at 189-92 (discussing how the facts in Woodson do not
meet the substantial certainty standard as exemplified by the bomb-throwing illustration
and attributing the confusion surrounding the standard to the supreme court's initial
misapplication of the standard in Woodson).
142. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 345,407 S.E.2d at 231; see Lambert, supra note 106, at 191.
143. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 335,407 S.E.2d at 225.
144. Id. at 346-47,407 S.E.2d at 232; Lambert, supra note 106, at 190-91.
145. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. b, illus. 1 (1965); Lambert,
supra note 106, at 189-92.
146. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 346-47, 407 S.E.2d at 232 (stating that this argument was a
more appropriate question for the jury to resolve).
147. Powell v. S & G Prestress Co., 114 N.C. App. 319, 328, 442 S.E.2d 143, 148 (1994)
(Wynn, J., dissenting), affd, 342 N.C. 182, 463 S.E.2d 79 (1995).
148. Mickles v. Duke Power Co., 342 N.C. 103, 110, 463 S.E.2d 206, 211 (1995).
149. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. b, illus. 1 (1965).
150. Lunsford v. Renn, _ N.C. App -700 S.E.2d 94, 98 (2010) (quoting Bullins v.
Schmidt, 322 N.C. 580, 583, 369 S.E.2d 601, 603 (1988)), discretionary review denied, 365
N.C. 193, 707 S.E.2d 244 (2011).
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Carolina with a body of established case law that can be used to
evaluate employer misconduct and distinguish such misconduct from
ordinary negligence."' The real fear has likely been the adoption of
too low a standard such that employers would be held liable for
152
simple negligence, misconduct that is clearly protected by the Act.

Although the courts have had occasional difficulty distinguishing
between willful, wanton, and reckless conduct, 153 they have had no

difficulty distinguishing between ordinary negligence and gross
negligence, 5 4 the very distinction Pleasantand Woodson were in fact

trying to preserve.155

151. See, e.g., Yancey v. Lea, 354 N.C. 48, 52-53, 550 S.E.2d 155, 157-58 (2001) ("[T]he
difference between [ordinary and gross negligence] is not in degree or magnitude of
inadvertence or carelessness, but rather is intentional wrongdoing or deliberate
misconduct affecting the safety of others."). An analog of gross negligence is "culpable
negligence," which is used in the criminal law to support a verdict of involuntary
manslaughter. See State v. Mack, __ N.C. App -,... 697 S.E.2d 490, 494 (2010) (defining
culpable negligence in such a context as "such recklessness or carelessness, proximately
resulting in injury or death, as imports a thoughtless disregard of consequences or a
heedless indifference to the safety and rights of others" (quoting State v. Wade, 161 N.C.
App. 686, 690, 589 S.E.2d 379, 382 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted))),
discretionaryreview denied,__ N.C. App. -, 704 S.E.2d 276 (2010).
152. See Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 338, 407 S.E.2d 222, 227 (1991).
153. See Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 715, 325 S.E.2d 244, 248 (1985)
("Constructive intent to injure exists where conduct threatens the safety of others and is so
reckless or manifestly indifferent to the consequences that a finding of willfulness and
wantonness equivalent in spirit to actual intent is justified. Wanton and reckless
negligence gives rise to constructive intent." (internal citation omitted)). The Pleasant
court attempted to detangle the three, yet ultimately and unfortunately lumped all three
into one category, concluding that an injury resulting from a co-employee's "willful,
wanton and reckless negligence" should fall outside the Act's exclusivity provision. Id. at
714-15, 325 S.E.2d at 247-48 (emphasis added); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 138,
§ 34, at 212 ("[T]here is a penumbra of what has been called 'quasi-intent.' To this area the
words 'willful,' 'wanton,' or 'reckless,' are customarily applied; and sometimes, in a single
sentence, all three. Although efforts have been made to distinguish them, in practice such
distinctions have consistently been ignored ...... (internal citations omitted));
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 2 cmts. a, b
(2010) (discussing the manner in which the three terms are often used interchangeably or
given the label "gross negligence").
154. See, e.g., Yancey, 354 N.C. at 53, 550 S.E.2d at 158.
It is clear from the foregoing language of this Court that the difference between
ordinary negligence and gross negligence is substantial. As this Court has stated:
An analysis of our decisions impels the conclusion that this Court, in
references to gross negligence, has used that term in the sense of wanton
conduct. Negligence, a failure to use due care, be it slight or extreme,
connotes inadvertence. Wantonness, on the other hand, connotes
intentional wrongdoing. Where malicious or wilful injury is not involved,
wanton conduct must be alleged and shown to warrant the recovery of
punitive damages. Conduct is wanton when in conscious and intentional
disregard of and indifference to the rights and safety of others.
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B. Adoption of a Gross Negligence Standard is Better Aligned with
the Policy Goals Behind Workers' Compensation Law
The Woodson court declined to hold an employer to the same
standard as tortious co-employees, concluding that a higher degree of
culpability for intentional misconduct of an employer is justified
simply because employers fund the workers' compensation coffers
and co-employees do not.56 This justification is highly misleading and
only true in a technical sense given that the public, which includes the
employees, ultimately bears the cost of the workers' compensation
system. The public assumes the cost of the workers' compensation
system through the higher cost of goods, but it is a cost the public is
willing to bear in exchange for preventing disabled workers from
becoming public charges. 5 7 Further, employees also pay indirectly as
the cost of workers' compensation insurance is passed on through
lower pay and fewer benefits.'58 Industrial accidents are sometimes
unavoidable, but it is doubtful that the public is willing to subsidize
compensation for injuries resulting from an employer's intentional
disregard for the law or basic safety.
As between employers and co-employees, there is a salient
argument that an employer's conduct should be more rigorously
scrutinized than the co-employee's conduct. Through the employer's
knowledge of safety regulations and the means required to implement
them, employers are in a better position to ensure the safety of their
employees. This institutional knowledge puts them on notice of safety
risks. If an employer's advantageous position provides knowledge of a
risk, then a conscious disregard of that risk should result in tort
liability for the employer.
The Woodson court also read more employer protection into the
Act than what workers' compensation legislation originally intended
to provide. Social policy behind the Act does not support protection
from gross negligence; rather, workers' compensation legislation was
designed to provide a swift remedy to workers for injuries caused by

Id. (quoting Hinson v. Dawson, 244 N.C. 23, 28, 92 S.E.2d 393, 396-97 (1956)).
155. See Woodson, 329 N.C. at 338, 407 S.E.2d at 227 ("The Act seeks to balance
competing interests ... between the rights of employees and their employers. It provides
for an injured employee's certain and sure recovery without having to prove employer
negligence ... " (emphasis added) (citing Pleasant,312 N.C. at 712, 325 S.E.2d at 247)).
156. Id. at 342, 407 S.E.2d at 229.
157. See JERNIGAN, JR., supra note 32, § 1.2, at 3.
158. See Price V. Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, The Adoption of Workers'
Compensation in the United States, 1900-1930, 41 J.L. & ECON. 305, 309-10 (1998).
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the hazards of the workplace, 5 9 to control and distribute liability for
accidental injuries, and to require industry to "take care of its own
wreckage." 1" In a call for reform eventually culminating in the first
state workers' compensation legislation, President Theodore
Roosevelt acknowledged that "it is revolting ... that the financial
burden of accidents occurring because of the necessary exigencies of
their daily occupation should be thrust upon those sufferers who were
least able to bear it."'' Thus, workers' compensation legislation was
meant to quickly compensate employees injured through the inherent
dangers of industrial employment and encourage safety in the
workplace, not to encourage misconduct by allowing employers to use
it as a shield.162
Indeed, the North Carolina Act only covers "injury by accident
arising out of and in the course of employment." '63 An "accident"
under the Act is defined as "an unlooked for and untoward event
which is not expected or designed by the injured employee .... [or] a
result produced by a fortuitous cause."" 6 This statutory language and
interpretation is meant to permit coverage when atypical conditions
precipitate an unintended injury to an employee and to preclude
165
compensation for injuries arising out of everyday work duties.
Thus, injuries as a result of an employer's intentional tort are an
unexpected "accident" under the Act from the perspective of the
66
employee and still compensable.
However, North Carolina courts have long held that the Act was
not intended to shield an employer from liability injuries caused by
159. See George H. Singer, Workers' Compensation: The Assault on the Shield of
Immunity-Coming to Blows with the Exclusive-Remedy Provisions of the North Dakota
Workers' CompensationAct, 70 N.D. L. REV. 905, 946 (1994).
160. Barber v. Minges, 223 N.C. 213, 216, 25 S.E.2d 837, 839 (1943).
161. Spieler, supra note 36, at 166 (quoting Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky,
Social Change and the Law of IndustrialAccidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50,68 n.69 (1967)).
162. See Barrino v. Radiator Specialty Co., 315 N.C. 500, 519, 340 S.E.2d 295, 306
(1986) (Martin, J., dissenting), overruled by Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 407
S.E.2d 221 (1991); see also Melissa F. Ross, Comment, Ripples in Treacherous Waters: A
Consideration of the Effects of North Carolina'sIntentional Tort Exception to Workers'
Compensation, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 513, 552-53 (1996) (discussing how retention of
the Woodson exception is supported by the purposes and policy behind workers'
compensation legislation).
163. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(6) (2011) (emphasis added).
164. Edwards v. Piedmont Publ'g Co., 227 N.C. 184, 186, 41 S.E.2d 592, 593 (1947)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
165. JERNIGAN, JR., supra note 32, § 5.2, at 52-53.
166. See Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 348-50, 407 S.E.2d 222, 233-34 (1991)
(explaining that an injury suffered by an employee as a result of an intentional tort is still
an "accident" within the meaning of the Act).
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his own intentional misconduct, notwithstanding the injury qualifying
as an accident under the Act.'6 7 Further, as the Barrino court rightly
pointed out, the justification for allowing intentional torts committed
by the employer to fall outside the exclusivity of the Act is that an
employer cannot allege that an injury caused by his own intentional
tort was an accident from his own point of view, and thus cannot
insulate himself from liability through the Act.168 Just as with a true
intentional tort, an injury resulting from an employer's disregard for
safety cannot ever reasonably be labeled an accident from the
employer's own perspective and also should not be protected under
the Act as an accident, and nothing more. Regardless of the label the

conduct is given, the courts cannot contend that the legislature
intended the workers' compensation fund to subsidize injuries that
arise because employers engage in egregious misconduct such as an
intentional disregard for safety, 169 even if that conduct was not
intended to injure the employee.
C. Adoption of a Gross Negligence Standard Better Addresses Policy
Goals of the Exceptions to Workers' Compensation Exclusivity

Holding employers accountable in tort for gross negligence
better addresses the shared policy goals of both Pleasant and
Woodson: culpability 7 ° and deterrence.' 7 1 In order to import a sense
167. See id. at 338-39, 407 S.E.2d at 227; supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
168. Barrino v. Radiator Specialty Co., 315 N.C. 500, 507, 340 S.E.2d 295, 300 (1986)
(quoting 2A LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 68.11, 68.13 (1984)),
overruled by Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991). The Barrino
court, however, agreed with Professor Larson that misconduct less than a true intentional
tort should still be considered an "accident" under the Act, even from the perspective of
the employer. Id.; see supra note 75.
169. See Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth. v. N.C. Indus. Comm'n, 336 N.C. 200,
203-04, 443 S.E.2d 716, 718-19 (1994) ("The philosophy which supports the Work[ers']
Compensation Act is 'that the wear and tear of human beings in modern industry should
be charged to the industry, just as the wear and tear of machinery has always been
charged. And while such compensation is presumably charged to the industry, and
consequently to the employer or owner of the industry, eventually it becomes a part of the
fair money cost of the industrial product, to be paid for by the general public patronizing
such products.' " (quoting Vause v. Vause Farm Equip. Co., 233 N.C 88, 92, 63 S.E.2d 173,
176 (1951))).
170. Compare Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 717, 325 S.E.2d 244, 249 (1985)
(explaining that allowing punitive damages for intentional torts, including those based on
constructive intent, "places responsibility upon the tortfeasor where it belongs"), with
Woodson, 329 N.C. at 341, 407 S.E.2d at 228 (requiring employer misconduct "tantamount
to an intentional tort" in order to support a civil tort action).
171. Compare Pleasant, 312 N.C. at 717, 325 S.E.2d at 249 (rationalizing that because
wanton conduct can be deterred, such conduct by a co-employee should fall outside the
Act's exclusivity provision), with Woodson, 329 N.C. at 342, 407 S.E.2d at 229 (stating that
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of moral deservedness, the important distinction in evaluating
whether employer misconduct should fall outside of the exclusivity
provision of the Act should not be a determination of whether
employer misconduct was substantially certain to injure an employee.
While a showing of a defendant employer's subjective knowledge of
risk should be required, the current constraint of requiring a showing
that the risk was substantially certain to injure is unnecessarily
excessive and may be, in many cases, difficult to demonstrate. The
important distinction is whether the injury was an "accident" caused
by ordinary negligence-misconduct subject to the exclusive remedy
provision12-or whether the injury was an "accident" caused by an
employer that had subjective knowledge of a safety risk and
consciously disregarded that risk-gross negligence that should not be
protected by the exclusive remedy provision. Because misconduct
that satisfies a gross negligence standard requires culpability as
demonstrated by a subjective knowledge of risk and disregard of that
risk, it is also certain to capture only misconduct that can be deterred.
This is precisely the misconduct North Carolina courts have already
recognized as behavior that can and should be deterred. 173
Requiring an injured employee to demonstrate gross negligence
on the part of the employer better serves the deterrence policy
behind the exclusivity exceptions as well. Employers are now
undoubtedly aware that employees have almost no judicial recourse
against an employer for injuries caused by the employer's intentional
misconduct, short of a true intentional tort such as battery-a result
completely contrary to what the Woodson court was hoping to
achieve.74 Thus, the deterrent effect that the Woodson court sought
to invite by allowing misconduct to fall outside the exclusivity
provision of the Act175 is completely undermined by the use of the
substantial certainty standard.

the substantial certainty standard operates as a deterrent for an employer's intentional
misconduct).
172. Pleasant,312 N.C. at 712, 325 S.E.2d at 246-47.
173. See id. at 715-17, 325 S.E.2d at 248-49; Hinson v. Dawson, 244 N.C. 23, 28, 92
S.E.2d 393, 396-97 (1956) (recognizing that punitive damages should be allowed for
misconduct characterized by an "intentional disregard of and indifference to the rights and
safety of others" because such misconduct can be deterred).
174. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 342, 407 S.E.2d at 229. ("The substantial certainty standard
satisfies the Act's purposes of providing trade-offs to competing interests and balancing
these interests, while serving as a deterrent to intentional wrongdoing and promoting
safety in the workplace.").
175. See id.
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Currently, the only deterrent to employer misconduct is the
threat of state-imposed monetary sanctions for failure to abide by
OSHANC regulations, but this system is largely ineffective.
Employers are required by statute to assure that workplace
conditions do not expose employees to "recognized hazards that ...
'
are likely to cause death or serious injury."176
State inspectors through

the North Carolina Department of Labor enforce compliance by
conducting inspections and levying fines, 177 but inspections are
infrequent, if they occur at all. 178 When employers are issued citations
and monetary fines, the penalties are often small compared to the
cost of the injuries that may result or have resulted from the
violation. 179 Thus, standing

alone, the threat of citations for

OSHANC violations and the monetary fines that accompany a failure
to comply with OSHANC regulations are toothless compared to the
threat of tort liability."

176. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-129(1) (2011). Employees are charged with complying with
the Act's standards as well. § 95-130(1).
177. See OccupationalSafety and Health Division Overview, N.C. DEP'T OF LABOR,
http://www.nclabor.com/osha/oshover.htm (last visited Feb. 25,2012).
178. See Ames Alexander & Franco Ordofiez, Safety Push that Followed Hamlet
Wanes, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 4, 2011, at 1A (discussing the
precipitous drop in both OSHA inspections and citations in recent years despite the
continued increase in the state's workforce).
179. Civil penalties may be assessed, but are not required, even for repeat or willful
violations. See § 95-138(a)(1). Monetary penalties are required to be imposed for serious
violations, defined in section 95-127(18), as "a substantial probability that death or serious
physical harm could result from a condition which exists ...unless the employer did not
know, and could not, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, know of the presence of
the violation," but the penalty is miniscule compared to damages in tort. See § 95138(a)(1) ("A minimum penalty of five thousand dollars ($5,000) to a maximum penalty of
seventy thousand dollars ($70,000) may be assessed for each willful or repeat violation.");
§ 95-138(a)(2) ("A penalty of up to seven thousand dollars ($7,000) shall be assessed for
each serious violation, except that a penalty of up to fourteen thousand dollars ($14,000)
shall be assessed for each serious violation that involves injury to an employee under 18
years of age."). Moreover, even when an employer willfully violates a regulation that
causes the death of an employee and criminal penalties can be assessed, the violation is
only a Class 2 misdemeanor and the monetary penalties are embarrassingly low
considering the loss of life. § 95-139(a), (b) (stating that an employer that willfully violates
a regulation that causes the death of an employee is guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor and
may be fined not more than $10,000 if the employee was over the age of eighteen and not
more than $20,000 if the employee was under the age of eighteen).
180. For example, Legal Aid of North Carolina has recently lodged a complaint against
the North Carolina Department of Labor for their lax enforcement of OSHANC
regulations in the farm industry, and requested the federal Department of Labor to
investigate. Letter from Mary Lee Hall, Senior Managing Att'y, Farmworker Unit, Legal
Aid of North Carolina, Inc., to David Michaels, Assistant Sec'y of Labor for Occupational
Safety & Health (Sept. 30, 2011), availableat http://pulse.ncpolicywatch.org/wp-content
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Pallet Express was no exception to the system's current inability
to deter misconduct. Prior to Nery's death, Pallet Express had not
been issued any citations for OSHANC safety violations regarding
the Hog Shredder. 8 1 Although this point is not clear, it can be safely
assumed that the Hog Shredder had not been inspected in the five
years before Nery's death. Even if the Department of Labor had
inspected the Hog Shredder prior to Nery's death, either the
inspection failed to discover that the Hog Shredder's safety guards
had been removed or Pallet Express remained incompliant after the
inspection. In any case, the inspection process certainly failed Nery.
Justice Martin, in his Barrinodissent, noted that courts should be
very concerned with discouraging deliberate employer behavior that
is likely to result in injury and allowing employers to assume statutory
immunity for this behavior. 82 He aptly observed that a system where
there is no accountability "encourage[s] the employer to weigh the
economic costs of compliance with safety regulations against the costs
of workers' compensation and to choose the most cost-effective
course of conduct."18' 3 If fines for OSHANC violations serve as an
ineffective deterrent and employers know that even the courts will
not impose liability for willful safety violations, there is no incentive
to comply with statutory safety regulations, or even to employ
common sense safety provisions, especially when doing so would
impose additional financial obligations. An effective, enforceable tort
remedy incentivizes employers to comply with state safety regulations
by threatening to penalize the employer twice-first through fines
imposed by the state and second through tort damages awarded by a
court. A tort remedy also compensates the injured employee or their
estate in the case of an employee that has been killed; only the state is
compensated as a result of OSHANC fines.1"

/uploads/2011/10/Letter-to-US-DOL-09-30-2011.pdf. In its complaint, Legal Aid alleges
OSHANC violations are often improperly and inconsistently classified, and that penalties
for violations are so regularly reduced that the citations have little to no deterrent effect.
Id.
181. Defendants-Appellees' Brief, supra note 28, at 2-3, 17, 19.
182. Barrino v. Radiator Specialty Co., 315 N.C. 500, 519, 340 S.E.2d 295, 306 (1986)
(Martin, J., dissenting), overruled by Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 221
(1991). Justice Martin declined to comment as to whether an employer should be held
liable for "willful, wanton, and reckless" conduct as was found in Pleasant because in his
opinion, the degree of conduct in Barrino well exceeded recklessness. Id. at 521, 340
S.E.2d at 307.
183. Id. at 519, 340 S.E.2d at 306.
184. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH Div., N.C. DEP'T OF LABOR, A GUIDE TO
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH IN NORTH CAROLINA 14, availableat http://www
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IV. APPLYING GROSS NEGLIGENCE IN THE EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE
CONTEXT

The Restatement (Third) of Torts provides guidance on types of
evidence that support a finding of a "reckless disregard" or "reckless
indifference to risk." 185 This guidance can also inform courts as they
determine whether an injured employee's claim should survive
summary judgment. The Restatement (Third) requires "knowledge of
the danger or... facts that would make the danger obvious to anyone
in the actor's situation." ' 6 In the context of employer misconduct,
this knowledge could take a multitude of forms, including knowledge
of a history of safety violations, knowledge of previous accidents
caused by the risk, or knowledge of an improperly trained employee.
Allegations of a defendant employer's subjective knowledge and
subsequent disregard of risks, likely supported by circumstantial
evidence, should raise an issue of material fact sufficient to survive
pre-trial dismissal.'87
Under the current standard, courts have been inconsistent in
their treatment of the presence of safety violations as support for a
successful Woodson claim. Many Woodson claims involve employers
that had knowledge of safety violations, yet some courts postWoodson have found evidence of this type insufficient to support an
inference of the requisite subjective knowledge.188 Moreover, courts
.nclabor.com/osha/etta/indguide/ig4.pdf (last updated Nov. 2011) (stating that penalties
collected are placed into the "Civil Penalty and Forfeiture Fund").
185. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 2 cmts. a, c (2010). The Restatement (Third) equates "reckless disregard" and
"reckless indifference to risk" with the term recklessness. Id. at cmt. a. North Carolina
courts distinguish reckless and wanton misconduct, using the latter term to describe
behavior that is in reckless disregard of the rights or safety of others. Pleasant v. Johnson,
312 N.C. 710, 714, 325 S.E.2d 244, 248 (1985).
186. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 2 cmt. c (2010). The Restatement (Third) distinguishes "knowledge of facts that
would make the danger obvious" from an ordinary negligence standard in which an actor
fails to draw a reasonable inference from known facts. Id. at 19-20. In the case of reckless
disregard for safety, an actor's knowledge of risk can be inferred by circumstantial
evidence such as evidence of the obviousness of a risk. Id.
187. See Barrino,315 N.C. at 518, 340 S.E.2d at 305-06 (Martin, J., dissenting).
188. Compare Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 345-46, 407 S.E.2d 222, 231-32
(1991) (finding evidence of previous citations as indicia of subjective knowledge of
dangerous condition), with Pendergrass v. Card Care, Inc., 333 N.C. 233, 238-40, 424
S.E.2d 391, 394-95 (1993) (holding employer knowledge of unguarded dangerous machine
parts in violation of OSHA standards fails to support inference of intent sufficient for
Woodson claim), and Regan v. Amerimark Bldg. Prods., Inc., 127 N.C. App 225, 228-29,
489 S.E.2d 421, 424-25 (1997) (concluding evidence of previous OSHA violation for
unguarded machine insufficient to support Woodson claim), affd 347 N.C. 665, 495 S.E.2d
378 (1998).
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have also used an absence of citations for safety violations or absence
of previous accidents as support for a lack of the requisite subjective
knowledge requirement. 8 9 It is hard to reconcile these two positions:
to say that an absence of citations or accidents helps to prove that the
employer had no knowledge of a substantial risk of injury should also
lead to the conclusion that a knowledge of safety violations or a
history of previous accidents would support an inference of
knowledge of a safety risk. Some courts, however, have tended to
discount previous accidents or knowledge of a safety violation as
90
evidence of nothing. 1
Using a lack of safety violations or accidents as evidence of a lack
of subjective knowledge is problematic because it creates an unstated
requirement that someone actually be hurt or killed as a result of
employer misconduct before the employer can be found to have the
requisite knowledge that it has exposed its employees to a risk. 191 In
Powell, Judge Wynn wisely recognized the absurdity of this
proposition by rejecting "the implication that a worksite must have
had a previous fatality or 'near miss' before its supervisors can be
held to know of the likelihood of serious injury or death" and further
asserting that "[e]mployees should not have to lose a co-worker
before their own safety can be ensured." 1" Moreover, it is anomalous
that an employer can disregard state-mandated statutory safety
regulations and in turn receive statutory protection from liability
through workers' compensation from the same state government.
189. Whitaker v. Town of Scotland Neck, 357 N.C. 552, 558, 597 S.E.2d 665,668 (2003),
reh'g granted, 356 N.C. 696, 579 S.E.2d 104 (2003), rev'd, 357 N.C. 552, 597 S.E.2d 665
(2003); Mickles v. Duke Power Co., 342 N.C. 103, 111,463 S.E.2d 206, 211 (1995); Jones v.
Willamette Indus., Inc., 120 N.C. App. 591, 594, 463 S.E.2d 294, 297 (1995), discretionary
review denied, 342 N.C. 656,467 S.E.2d 714 (1996).
190. See Pendergrass,333 N.C. at 238-40, 424 S.E.2d at 394-95; Regan, 127 N.C. App.
at 228-29, 489 S.E.2d at 424. But see Pastva v. Naegele Outdoor Adver., Inc., 121 N.C.
App. 656, 659, 468 S.E.2d 491, 494 (1996) (reversing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of a
Woodson claim where the employer had actual knowledge of unsafe conditions and a
history of previous citations and fines for safety violations in the workplace), discretionary
review denied, 343 N.C. 308, 471 S.E.2d 74 (1996); Arroyo v. Scottie's Prof'l Window
Cleaning, Inc., 120 N.C. App. 154, 156-60, 461 S.E.2d 13, 15-17 (1995) (reversing a Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal of a Woodson claim where the employer had knowledge of unsafe
conditions practiced by a supervisor employee in contravention of OSHA requirements),
discretionaryreview granted,342 N.C. 190, 463 S.E.2d 231 (1995), review dismissed by, 343
N.C. 118, 468 S.E.2d 84 (1996). However, it is worth noting that Pastva and Arroyo were
both reversals of Rule 12(b)(6) motions (dismissals for failure to state a claim), not
reversals of motions for summary judgment in favor of the defendant employer. Pastva,
121 N.C. App. at 659, 468 S.E.2d at 494; Arroyo, 120 N.C. App. at 160, 461 S.E.2d at 17.
191. Powell v. S & G Prestress Co., 114 N.C. App. 319, 330, 442 S.E.2d 143, 149 (1994),
affd, 342 N.C. 182, 463 S.E.2d 79 (1995).
192. Id.
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The guidance in the Restatement (Third) serves to solve this very
problem by including not only actual knowledge of a risk, such as
knowledge of a safety violation or previous accident, but also "facts
that would make the danger obvious to anyone in the actor's
'
This standard captures knowledge such as the
situation."193
intentional disregard of safety regulations or removal of safety guards
from machinery as misconduct that comes with liability, without
requiring previous citations or accidents. As previously noted,
employers are in the best position to provide safe work conditions
and their conscious disregard for safety, especially state-mandated
regulations, should not be trivialized as ordinary negligence
encompassed by the Act.
The Restatement (Third) also considers the magnitude and
likelihood of risk as relevant inquiries in determining a finding of
gross negligence.'94 While an employer's failure to eliminate all risk
cannot even be fairly characterized as ordinary negligence, 195 a
considerable imbalance between the magnitude of an anticipated risk
and the burden of providing preventative measures is indicative of a
reckless disregard for the safety of others. 196 Although the courts have
previously rejected the magnitude of the risk as a relevant inquiry for
a Woodson claim,"9 the culpability and deterrence policies behind
Woodson support holding a tortious employer liable for an injury as a
result of gross negligence, however unlikely to occur, if the employer
had the power to prevent the injury but chose to disregard that risk.
Further, the Restatement (Third) asserts that actual knowledge of
even an unlikely risk coupled with a small burden of providing
safeguards can establish a reckless disregard for the risk. 198 Under
Woodson, if an employer's misconduct causes an unlikely injury, the
misconduct would not fall outside the exclusivity provision of the
193.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL

HARM § 2 cmt. c (2010).
194. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL

HARM § 2 cmt. d (2010).
195. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 2 cmt. e (2010) ("[C]onduct is not negligent if its advantages
outweigh its disadvantages.").
196. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 2 cmt. d (2010).
700 S.E.2d 76, 79 (2010)
197. See Valenzuela v. Pallet Express, Inc.__ N.C.App....
(rejecting plaintiffs attempt to distinguish precedent by arguing the relevance that the
magnitude of harm resulting from a pallet shredder is greater than the harm from a
circular saw).
198. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 2 cmt. d (2010).
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Act. 1 9 However, when the employer has the knowledge and power to
safeguard against an injury, distinguishing employer liability based on
the likelihood of an injury flies in the face of the policy behind
workers' compensation legislation and Woodson.
Valenzuela v. Pallet Express graphically demonstrates the need
for a new standard. The plaintiff alleged that Pallet Express
intentionally removed manufacturer-installed safety guards from the
Hog Shredder and incurred a multitude of OSHANC violations at the
time of Nery's death, including assigning an untrained, underage
employee to work on the Hog Shredder."° The president of Pallet
Express admitted to ordering the removal of the safety guard at the
mouth of the Hog Shredder-a guard intended to prevent personnel
from falling into the machine and being crushed-in order to increase
productivity, with the knowledge that the manufacturer specifically
warned against such removal.0 1 Moreover, the president concealed
the removal from the employees, supervisors, and operations
managers.21 2 The court of appeals rejected these allegations as
evidence that Pallet Express "knew its [actions were] substantially
certain to cause serious injury or death to employees." 203 However,
the Valenzuela court offered nothing more, and therefore it remains
unclear exactly what the plaintiff's evidence failed to demonstrate: a
lack of evidence of Pallet Express's knowledge that it was creating a
substantial risk of injury or death, a lack of evidence that the risk was
substantially certain to cause injury or death, or both.
Moreover, Valenzuela v. Pallet Express demonstrates how
adopting the gross negligence standard achieves the objectives of
both workers' compensation legislation and the Woodson court. If the
Supreme Court of North Carolina were to adopt the gross negligence
standard, Valenzuela is a clear-cut case for overcoming a motion for
summary judgment. The plaintiffs provided evidence that Pallet
Express had both "knowledge of the danger [and] of facts that would
make the danger obvious to anyone in the actor's situation. ' ' 2 4 They
alleged that Pallet Express intentionally removed safety guards in
199. See Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330,340-41,407 S.E.2d 222,228 (1991).
200. Valenzuela, - N.C. App. at __, 700 S.E.2d at 79.

201. Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief, supra note 14, at 6. The manual warned that "[a]
damaged or missing guard or defective safety device can fully expose operating personnel
to the danger of personal injury or death." Id.
202. Id.
203. Valenzuela, - N.C. App. at __, 700 S.E.2d at 79 (citing Woodson, 329 N.C. at 340,
407 S.E.2d at 228).
204.
HARM

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL

§ 2 cmt. c (2010).
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order to increase production and allowed an improperly trained
underage worker to operate the pallet shredder without proper
supervision, all in contravention of state and federal safety
regulations. 5 These allegations demonstrate actual knowledge of a
substantial risk of injury and the employer's intentional removal of
manufacturer-installed safety guards resulted in a substantial risk to
the employees. Further, the concealment of the removal supports an
inference that the employer had knowledge of the substantial risk to
employees. This evidence was exactly the type Justice Martin
envisioned when he warned against using summary judgment to
dispose of claims involving issues of subjective intent. 06 Additionally,
because an employer is in the unique position of being charged with
the knowledge of safety regulations, knowledge of a lack of
compliance is a fact that would make a safety risk obvious to an
employer, further bolstering the denial of the employer's motion for
summary judgment. The gross negligence standard removes from the
protection of the Act only misconduct in which the employer has
knowingly, intentionally disregarded the safety of his employees, thus
remaining true to the goal of workers' compensation legislation to
protect employers from liability for ordinary negligence.2 7 This
standard also addresses the culpability and deterrence policy goals of
the Woodson exception 20 8 by requiring a demonstration of an
employer's subjective knowledge of risk-creation and ensuring that
employers are not permitted to intentionally disregard employee
safety without consequences.
CONCLUSION

Twenty-one years ago, the Supreme Court of North Carolina in
Woodson v. Rowland created a substantive right for injured
employees to assert a tort claim against an employer in order to deter
egregious employer behavior and to promote employee safety. The
poorly defined, oft-misunderstood substantial certainty standard has
eroded the utility of the Woodson claim as both a valuable remedy for
employees and an effective deterrent for employer misconduct.
Placing the lofty burden of proving both subjective knowledge and
intent of the employer and a high likelihood of injury squarely on the
205. Valenzuela, _ N.C. App. at -, 700 S.E.2d at 79.
206. Barrino v. Radiator Specialty Co., 315 N.C. 500, 518, 340 S.E.2d 295, 305-06
(1986) (Martin, J., dissenting), overruled by Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 407
S.E.2d 221 (1991).
207. See supra Part III.B.
208. See supra Part III.C.
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shoulders of the injured employee is manifestly unjust, and the
substantial certainty standard has ultimately proved to be an
unsuccessful attempt at providing injured employees recourse against
employer misconduct. A hallmark principle of tort law is that
"liability must be based upon conduct which is socially
unreasonable."'2 9 It is both socially unreasonable and unacceptable to
allow employers to hide behind a shield of limited liability while
affirmatively disregarding the safety of North Carolina workers.
However, there is an opportunity, through a gross negligence
standard, to redefine Woodson claims in such a way that continues to
balance the competing interests of employer and employee, while
satisfying the policy goals of both workplace safety and effectively
deterring employer misconduct.
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